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A REACTION: "STAND UP,
YOUR FATHER [A LAWYER] IS PASSING"

Bumele V. Powell*
Professor Steven Lubet's review examines in the lawyering
context the truth of Due de La Rochefoucauld's observation that
"[o]ur virtues are mostly but vices in disguise."1 His question one going to the very heart of what lawyering is about - asks read
ers of To Kill a Mockingbird whether they would be equally pre
pared to accept the fictional Atticus Fmch as the personification of
the good lawyer if his black client, defendant Tom Robinson, actu
ally committed the rape of the white woman, Mayella Ewell, for
which he was charged. If Robinson was a rapist, how then does one
square Atticus's aggressive blame-the-victim defense with his
heroic, defender-of-the-innocent personae?
Asked this way, the issue is essentially the one posed rhetori
cally some time ago by Professor Wasserstrom: Why is it so plausi
ble to talk about the amorality of the lawyer who represents all
clients irrespective of their moral character?2
·

One answer, of course, is the one that is scoffed at as little more
than a rationalization by Wasserstrom3 and marginalized as belong
ing to the "adversary system purist" by Professor Lubet4• In the
harshest view, what is said to be involved is a willingness of lawyers,
like actors cast in leading roles, to play the role of advocates. Like
Gregory Peck, Robert Duvall, Harrison Ford, Richard Gere, or Ian
McGlothlen, lawyers are amoral participants in a theatrical social
production called a criminal trial. The play is the thing. They are
divorced from moral, ethical, or social accountability for their
amoral soliloquies. Their courtroom posturing is tolerated because
under our system, the lawyer's duty is, by definition, to play the role
of the zealous advocate for his clients.5
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law.
B.A. 1970, UMKC; J.D. 1973, WISconsin; LL.M. 1979, Harvard. - Ed.
1. THE MAxlMs OF THE Due DE LA RoCHEFOUCAULD 31 (Constantine Fitt Gibbon
trans., Allan Wmgate Ltd. 1957) (1678).
2. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RTS. 1, 2-15 (1975).
3. See id.
4. Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1339, 1355 (1999).
5. "We have all heard it said that, 'an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but
one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons . . . is his first and only duty; and in
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More sympathetically stated, a close variant of this view does.
not deny the moral, ethical, and social dilemma in which lawyers
who defend the "indefensible" must find themselves. In this view,
however, lawyers who commit to the representation of the unholy
criminal defendant know in their heart of hearts that they are doing
wrong, but accept a sort of social pass. They are not to be held
answerable for their hypocritical advancing of arguments that serve
their clients, regardless of the conflicts posed by their personal
moral, and ethical views, because, as a society, we have asked them,
and ourselves, to refrain from such condemnations. 6
Lubet's critique of Atticus Finch, however, prompts a third, and
I think ultimately more satisfying answer. Whether Atticus is seen
through his daughter's loving eyes or Lubet's reconstruction
through cross-examination, an underlying truth remains: There is
simply nothing immoral, amoral, or hypocritical about good people
advancing interests that are incidentally shared by bad people.
Moreover, to the extent that a good person would be a good lawyer�
attorneys must, by definition, maintain fealty to a code of profes
sional behavior that is uniquely demanding. That code, in large
part because it has been established through open and critical pub
lic debate, however, leaves little room to maneuver on many of the
most important moral and social concerns of the day. Thus, the
challenge is that it commands adherence by lawyers to demanding
and often intentionally self-critical standards. In this sense, the law
yer, like Atticus Finch, who continuously acts to uphold principle especially in the face of public disapprobation - has by any wor
thy definition acted heroically on behalf of his client, the judicial
system, and the larger society.
This is not to argue that the lawyer who satisfies this - shall we
say, democratic - description of heroic lawyering obviates the pos
sibly related need to answer for his or her moral obligations. It
concedes only that whatever the strength of the moral claims, they
rest on a priori assumptions that would necessarily force any exami
nation of a lawyer's ethics outside the practical range of public
discussion.1
Confronted, though, as an issue of public discussion - one in
which we can confront head-on the kinds of questions that Lubet
raises precisely because the democratic process has, or has not,
anticipated their interjection - our critique can be as starkly stated
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others.'" Id. at 1355-56. (quoting TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 {1821)).
6. See MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 3 {1997); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 {1980).
7. See Burnele Venable Powell, Risking the Terrible Question ofReligion in the Life of the
Lawyer, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1321 (1998) (exploring the possible tension between a lawyer's
professional ethical duty and the moral obligations imposed by his or her religion).
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as his concerns. We must admit, as Lubet seems ultimately pre
pared to do, that the "she wanted it" defense, the "pig farmer's
daughter suspicion,"8 the invocation of the imagery of lynching
("high-tech," or otherwise), and the myriad of other fancy and fan
ciful defenses and prosecutions that may be available have a place
in our system of criminal justice. We must constantly remind our
selves, however, that theirs is a limited place.

In taking the measure of Atticus Finch, therefore, our analysis
must begin with an effort to take a measure of ourselves. Atticus,
or any lawyer for that matter, begins that larger examination by
first asking himself whether he is up to the expectation that the law
yer's oath commits him.
Lubet has aided the cause of societal and self-examination by
deftly showing the plausibility of an alternative reading of Harper
Lee's classic. Not to be missed, however, is that what makes
Lubet's challenge to weigh the virtues of Atticus· Finch plausible is
Lee's initial willingness to infuse her work with the particulars and
imagery of the flawed society that she shows us through Scout one steeped in racism, sexism, classism, and virtually every other
negative "ism" imaginable.
In this context, the issue of Atticus Finch's heroism, basic good
ness, and professionalism can only be resolved in one way. For if
we accept, as Lubet would have us do, that Atticus, like Scout and
like the reader, is capable of recognizing the biases - good and bad
- that permeated his society, we must be equally capable of under
standing why his heroism and standing as the paradigmatic lawyer is
not diminished regardless of the guilt or innocence of his client.
Atticus does not succeed because he sets an innocent man free, but
because he insists, as must every lawyer, on the freedom to make
the arguments within the bounds of law that are necessary for the
full ventilation of issues in a criminal case. In other words, Atticus
is not a hero because he won for Tom Robinson, but because, in
providing Tom Robinson the kind of defense that we, as a society,
have defined as desirable, he won for all of us.

8. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE Pm FARMER'S DAUGHTER AND OTHER TALES OF
.AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 TO THE
PRESENT (1999).

